Judiciary’s Directive to Governors and President ...... CONSTITUTIONAL CHECK OR INSTITUTIONAL OVERREACH? : Vanam Jwala Narasimha Rao

 Judiciary’s Directive to Governors and President 

CONSTITUTIONAL CHECK 

OR INSTITUTIONAL OVERREACH?

Vanam Jwala Narasimha Rao

The Hans India (20-04-2025)

IS democracy caught between the weight of constitutional mandates and the strain of moral obligations? Indian democracy has endured as the most accepted and resilient form of governance, thanks to the foundations laid by Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister. Democracy thrives if only its institutions operate within a framework of ‘Mutual Respect, Institutional Restraint, and Clearly Defined Boundaries.’ 

Vice President Jagdeep Dhankar, while reacting to the recent Supreme Court Directive imposing timelines on President (Governor as well), echoed his concern that, India was never intended to be a democracy where judges assume the roles of ‘Lawmakers, Executive Authority’ and a ‘Super Parliament.’ The basic proposition laid down by the Apex Court is, ‘No exercise of power under the Constitution is beyond the pale of Judicial Review.’ Both are to be debated together.

Supreme Court set one-month deadline for Governors and three-months for the President (When referred for consideration by Governors) to act on bills passed by State Assemblies. This ignited crucial debate in view of the directive that draws attention to significant themes such as judicial assertiveness, institutional equilibrium, and constitutional conventions. 

Rationale of Judiciary fixing time limit when it is itself burdened with an enormous backlog of pending cases is to be pondered. Infinite cases have dragged on for decades. ‘Justice delayed is justice denied.’ If constitutional heads are expected to act within defined timelines, should the Judiciary also adhere to a similar deadline for the disposal of cases? 

Can a nominated Governor be treated at par with an elected President? Governors and the President in effect are ‘Unequal Equals.’ Equating the discretionary timelines of Governors and the President introduces a point of constitutional and democratic friction. The President is elected by a broad-based electoral college comprising Members of Parliament and State Legislatures. Governors are appointed and often reflect the political will of the ruling party at center. The expectations of neutrality between the two roles vary significantly. 

President may rightly believe that discretion, including the time taken for consideration, is integral to the office. A court-imposed deadline, however reasonable it may appear, could be seen as an encroachment on this solemn constitutional duty. President of India is the formal head of the ‘Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary’ in addition to as the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Armed Forces. This office holds the power to make significant constitutional appointments, including Prime Minister, Union Ministers, Governors, and Judges of the Supreme and High Courts. These underscore the authoritative and representative stature of the President. 

Before assuming office, the President of India is required to take an oath or make a solemn affirmation in the presence of the Chief Justice of India, affirming that he or she will faithfully execute the duties of the office and, to the best of his or her ability, ‘Preserve, Protect, and Defend the Constitution and the Law’ while serving the well-being of the people of India. This oath symbolizes the constitutional and moral responsibility entrusted to the highest office of the Republic. The scope of this responsibility, even under the guise of efficiency, must be scrutinized carefully.

A multi-dimensional exploration of this issue becomes necessary to illuminate the underlying implications. Should the Supreme Court’s directive be viewed as a step toward greater accountability, or does it verge on institutional overreach? Constitution empowers the President and the Governors to assent to, withhold, or return a Bill for reconsideration, without prescribing a specific timeline for such action. By introducing a three-month deadline, Supreme Court appears to have filled a constitutional silence. This move, while rooted in democratic urgency, must contend with the broader architecture of Indian Constitutionalism. 

Presidents of India have traditionally exercised their responsibilities with dignity, discretion, and a sense of constitutional restraint, rarely, if ever, engaging in public confrontation with the Union Cabinet. But several Governors have either delayed assent to Bills, withheld action without explanation, or even made public their disagreements with elected state governments, sometimes triggering political tensions. Supreme Court’s uniform directive to both constitutional heads appears to overlook the qualitative distinction between the two roles, thereby applying a one-size-fits-all approach to offices that are fundamentally different in nature, legitimacy, and function.

This naturally leads to a deeper constitutional question: Who prevails when judicial review confronts executive discretion? A fundamental tension exists between the judiciary’s reliance on judicial review and the Constitution’s framing of the President’s role in terms of powers and responsibilities. The authority of courts to review legislative and executive actions is firmly established. However, the President’s constitutional powers, anchored in multiple Articles and upheld by precedent, are not easily subjected to conventional forms of administrative review. 

Can judicial review be extended to override or prescribe limits to an authority endowed with such constitutional autonomy? This is where the debate becomes truly nuanced. Judicial review is undoubtedly a cornerstone of Indian Constitutionalism, but so too is the principle of institutional independence. Unless there is a demonstrable case of mala fide intent or a clear constitutional breach, the judiciary’s directive could be seen as drifting toward institutional overreach, even if it arises from a genuine concern for democratic accountability. 

Delays and the Irony within is an interesting phenomenon. A critique of executive delays would be incomplete without acknowledging the ‘elephant in the room’ the judiciary’s own record. {This refers to an obvious and significant issue that is being ignored or deliberately left unaddressed during legal discussions, judgments, or arguments, even though everyone is aware of it. It is a glaring problem or truth that is uncomfortable to confront, so it remains unspoken, even though it dominates the legal or political landscape.}

Landmark cases, including Ayodhya, electoral disqualification matters, and civil disputes, have languished in courts for years, even decades. In many cases, justice has been denied not by rejection but by deferral. That judicial pendency and inaction, especially in high-stakes constitutional matters, erodes the moral high ground from which timelines are now being prescribed.

This can be put as ‘The irony is palpable.’ Can an institution battling systemic delay set deadlines for others? The Constitutional Spirit and Convention in India’s democratic stability has been anchored not only in written provisions but also in healthy constitutional conventions. Presidents have never publicly defied Prime Ministers, nor have they withheld Bills (Including referred by Governors) indefinitely. These conventions, are sacrosanct in parliamentary democracy. 

Yet, when Governors delay Bills or engage in partisan behavior, they violate these very conventions. The solution is not necessarily judicial command but the revival of normative political behavior or to be precise, respect for federalism, transparency in appointments, and institutional restraint. Much like in the British tradition, where the monarch’s role has been reduced to dignified formality, the Indian President’s role has evolved through convention. Governors must follow suit. Constitutional provisions are only part of the story. Conventions complete the narrative of democratic maturity.

The Supreme Court’s directive mandating timely assent to Bills is, at its core, a well-intentioned attempt to ensure that democratic processes are not undermined by bureaucratic inertia or political maneuvering. However, in seeking to uphold constitutional values, the judiciary must also exercise restraint and avoid the temptation to expand its mandate beyond what the Constitution envisions. 

The real reform lies in depoliticizing constitutional appointments, encouraging Presidents and Governors to respect both text and spirit, and ensuring the judiciary reflects internally on its delays before prescribing standards to others. Adhering to checks and balances by the ‘Triumvirate of Indian Democracy’ is must. Constitution enshrined several measures so that none of the Trinity transgresses on other’s territory. 

Naturally, the Supreme Court’s directive and its broader tone in recent judgments, has raised eyebrows, especially in its application of time-bound mandates to the office of the President. Constitution and a plethora of landmark verdicts have repeatedly clarified the distinct roles and limits of the three branches of government. 

Will it be wrong to assume that the Judiciary will act judiciously while rendering justice? In a democracy, institutions thrive not by competing for supremacy but by exercising mutual restraint. That alone ‘Preserves, Protects, and Defends the Constitution’ not just in oath, but in practice.