South China Sea Crisis and China's Foreign Policy: Vanam Jwala Narasimha Rao

South China Sea Crisis and China's Foreign Policy

Vanam Jwala Narasimha Rao

            

The Southeast Asian regional summit ended in bitterness on July 13 over China's assertive role in the strategic South China Sea, failing to agree on a concluding joint statement for the first time in its 45-year history. The South China Sea is a part of the Pacific Ocean, encompassing an area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan of around 3,500,000 square kilometers. One-third of the world's shipping transits through its waters. It is also believed that the part holds huge oil and gas reserves beneath its seabed. The Philippines deplored ASEAN's failure to address the worsening row, and criticized Cambodia--a close ally of China--for its handling of the issue during the foreign ministers' meeting. Philippines also hinted at the risk of a serious conflict. The South China Sea has become Asia's biggest potential military flashpoint as Beijing's sovereignty claim over a huge, looping area has set it against Vietnam and the Philippines as the three countries race to tap possibly huge oil reserves.

This recent confrontation between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea has increased suspicions regarding the rise of China according to Kai He, visiting Fellow at the East-West Center in Washington and Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Utah State University. He says that as the United States claims to “rebalance towards Asia,” the diplomatic and military crises between China and its neighbors will inevitably involve US interests in the Asia-Pacific.

Existing studies of Chinese crisis behavior focus mainly on military conflicts, such as the Korean War, the Sino-Indian War and the Sino-Vietnamese War. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, China has not engaged in any overt military conflicts with another state. However, there have been sporadic “near crises” between China and other countries which had the latent potential to escalate further into military confrontations, such as the 1995-96 Taiwan canal Crisis, the Sino-Japanese boat collision in 2010 near the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands and the 2001 EP-3 incident (The mid-air collision between a United States Navy "EP-3E ARIES II signals intelligence aircraft" and a People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) "J-8II interceptor fighter jet" on April 1, 2001, resulting in an international dispute between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, known as the "Hainan Island incident").

The provisional constitution after it was adopted in September 1949, clearly stipulated that the basic principle of China's foreign policy was to guarantee independence, freedom and territorial integrity of the state, support protracted world peace and friendly cooperation among peoples of all countries in the world, and oppose imperialist policies of aggression and war. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China revised China's foreign policy as: "China adheres to an independent foreign policy as well as to the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries; China consistently opposes imperialism, hegemonyism and colonialism, works to strengthen unity with the people of other countries, supports the oppressed nations and the developing countries in their just struggle to win and preserve national independence and develop their national economies, and strives to safeguard world peace and promote the cause of human progress."

          Since China suffered imperialist aggression and oppression for over 100 years before the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, it regards the hard-earned right of independence as the basic principle of foreign policy. The pronounced common aspiration of the Chinese people as well as the people of the world is to maintain peace and to eliminate wars.

          The five principles of peaceful coexistence were put forward in line with the reality of a multipolar world. Respect to sovereignty is the most fundamental principle in a new type of international relations. Mutual non-aggression means to get rid of the threat of using arms and armed threat in the internal relations among countries. Non-interference in each other's international affairs is the most important principle in international relations to guarantee each country's right to take care of its own internal affairs and prevent any other country from interfering with any means. Equality and mutual benefit mean political equality, economic equality, cooperation, mutual benefit and supplement to each other's needs. Peaceful coexistence calls on all countries to seek common interests, reserve differences, respect each other, maintain friendly cooperation and live in harmony regardless of differences in their social systems and ideologies.

            There are puzzles in explaining the patterns of China’s foreign policy crisis management since the end of the Cold War. For example, why did China act so dramatically in response to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Cornell University during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis? If military avoidance was the major goal, China’s multiple rounds of military exercises and missile tests actually reveal more weakness than strength.

On the other hand, why did China seek accommodation with the United States in the 2001 EP-3 incident and release the US crew after receiving a vaguely-worded “apology” from the then US Ambassador to China? What are the conditions that determine Chinese leaders’ decisions for coercion or compromise during a foreign policy crisis?

            China’s foreign policy crisis behavior is influenced by three integrated factors. The severity of the crisis is the first factor. If China is a victim of the crisis or its core interests are seriously challenged, it is difficult for China to back down, at least immediately. The authority of Chinese decision makers is another key factor in shaping China’s behavior. If a Chinese leader has not yet established his authority within the communist political and military bureaucracy, he may not be able to control the interests of other factions when coordinating a response.

            Last, but not least, international pressure— the status of China’s relations with the United States and other great powers—also plays a crucial role in influencing Chinese leaders’ foreign policy crisis behavior.

These factors frame Chinese leaders’ policy choices during crises in a very dynamic way. A domestically and internationally confident Chinese leader may choose an accommodative way to deal with a serious foreign policy crisis, such as the EP-3 incident. A weak leader may choose to escalate or even initiate an unnecessary crisis to divert domestic strife or consolidate domestic authority.

This year there will be a leadership transition in China, and maybe the election of a new president in the United States. The new Chinese political leadership will need time to consolidate their domestic authority, and if elected, Mitt Romney’s Chinese policy will take some time to unfold. Depending on circumstances, it may be “the best of times” or “the worst of times” in US-China relations.

            Some analysts suggest that since 2008 China’s foreign policy behavior has become more assertive. The United States needs to adjust its own policies toward China. It is not constructive to deal with China using policies from the last century. Today, because of China’s increased global standing, it has to more forcibly condemn and react to what it perceives as provocative unilateral actions towards Taiwan on behalf of the United States. US policy makers would be well-advised to consider developing a new China policy that is more considerate of China’s interests going into the 21st century.

            The United States should also avoid meddling in China’s domestic affairs and let China deal with its own domestic problems. This does not mean that the international community should ignore what Chinese leaders do to their people in their own country. Instead, the United States and other nations should encourage, rather than try to force, China to abide by global rules and norms, both diplomatically and strategically.

            The United States further needs to make use of Face Saving strategies to help shape Chinese leaders’ policy choices, especially during foreign policy crises. Some US politicians frequently claim in public that confrontation between the United States and China is inevitable. However, Chinese leaders are reluctant in public to claim rivalry or enmity with other countries. If US leaders can spare Chinese leaders’ from losing “face” in public without jeopardizing US interests, then Chinese leaders are more likely to cooperate within the realm of international affairs, especially during foreign policy crises.

            To quote Joseph Nye: “If we treat China as an enemy, it will definitely become one.” If the United States treats China as a friend, it may or may not become one that shares the same interests and values with the United States. However, Chinese leaders will at least behave more conciliatorily towards the United States, especially during future foreign policy crises.

(Source: "Understanding China’s Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior" by Kai He, visiting Fellow at the East-West Center in Washington published in Asia Pacific Bulletin in its July 11, 2012 issue)